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Market prices of corporate bond spreads and of credit default swap (CDS) rates do not match 
each other.  In this paper, we argue that the liquidity premium, the cheapest-to-deliver (CTD) 
option and actual market segmentation explain the pricing differences. Using the European 
transaction data from Reuters and Bloomberg, we estimate a liquidity premium that is time-
varying and firm-specific. We show that when time-dependent liquidity premiums are 
considered, corporate bond spreads and CDS rates behave in a much closer way than previous 
studies have shown. We also find that high equity volatility drives pricing differences that can 
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The valuation of credit default swaps (CDS) requires estimating the expected loss in the event that 
the reference entity defaults in the future. However, corporate bond yields combine different types of risk 
for which investors demand compensation. The most discussed component is credit risk, which 
compensates investors for the risk of non-repayment. Another component is interest rate risk, which is 
stripped out in the spread but may nonetheless affect it via call features or prepayment options. Corporate 
bond yields also contain a liquidity premium, which reflects the transaction cost of a particular bond. In 
this paper, we conduct an empirical examination of the pricing of the default premium by first 
decomposing the bond yield into different layers and then examining how the liquidity premium and the 
implied default premium behave. This research thus addresses the question of whether the corporate debt 
market is integrated with the credit protection market and of how consistent the pricing of CDS is with the 
pricing of corporate bonds in Europe. 
    This paper differs from previous research in that it decomposes the corporate bond yield spread into 
liquidity and credit risk components first. We compare the default premium implied from debt markets to 
the CDS premium quoted in the credit protection market before and after stripping out liquidity. 
Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2003) extract the liquidity component by examining the difference between a 
pricing model and the market CDS spread, and in this way, they assume that the debt market and the credit 
protection market are perfectly integrated. Our approach seeks to identify liquidity as a separate item. By 
removing the liquidity component, we can check to what extent the debt market and the credit protection 
market are integrated. Our approach also differs from those of Hull, Predescu and White (2003) and 
Houweling and Vorst (2002). This article sets out to determine whether liquidity rather than the choice of 
the risk-free rate can explain the pricing discrepancies of the default premium in the corporate debt market 
and the credit protection market. Houweling and Vorst (2002) find an average absolute pricing error of 33 
basis points using treasury yields and 11 basis points when using swap rates. We find a much lower 
pricing error of 11.6 basis points using treasury yields. After adjusting liquidity in bond yields, the 
absolute pricing error in cross section is almost zero.  
Liquidity is a difficult concept to define, even more so to quantify.  In this paper, we implement the 
limited dependent variable model (hereafter the LDV model)  - proposed by Lesmond, Ogden and 
Trzcinka (1999) and extended to fixed-income markets by Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2003) - to separate 
the liquidity premium from bond yields and to estimate a time-varying, firm-specific liquidity premium. In 
general, the LDV model derives the liquidity premium well. The cross-sectional mean of the liquidity premium is 11.2 basis points, which is on the low side of the liquidity p remium found in previous 
research. Our estimate of the mean liquidity premium ranges from 2 basis points to 60 basis points. 
Liquidity is a major driver of the difference in prices between the corporate bond market and the credit 
protection market: When the liquidity premium is considered, spread differences fall and these differences 
are not significant anymore for 18 out of 39 firms.  
The regression results show that liquidity is an important component in the bond yield spread. T -
statistics of the liquidity variable are significant for 35 out of the 39 sample firms. For each firm, the root 
mean squared error decreases and the adjusted R² increases by adding liquidity on top of the credit 
component. However, the influence of liquidity and credit varies for different rating groups (as well as for 
different companies, of course). As the credit quality of the firm declines, credit risk becomes the principal 
explanatory power, while liquidity, though significant, decreases in explanatory power. For higher rated 
firms, the major portion of the yield spread, ranging from 60% to 80%, can be explained by the 
combination of credit and liquidity. For a lower rated firm, credit risk alone may explain over 95% of the 
yield spread. Our results show that though liquidity a dds explaining power, an important portion of 
spreads in high-rated bonds, ranging from 20% to 40%, still remains unexplained. By plotting the implied 
bond par yield and CDS quotes, we observe that the divergence period correlates with financial distress or 
periods of high market uncertainty. We explored the factors driving the pricing differences and found that 
the pricing discrepancies are highly correlated and explained by equity volatility. The regression results 
support both the role of the CTD option  in European CDS prices and the market imperfection argument. 
When participants in the two markets react differently to the same credit fundamentals, the pricing 
discrepancies provide arbitrage opportunities to sophisticated investors. 
     
   1
    1. Introduction 
    The valuation of credit default swaps (CDS) requires estimating the expected loss in the event 
that the reference entity defaults in the future. The main component of expected loss, the risk-
neutral default probability, can be estimated either from equity (as is the case indirectly  in 
structural form models
3) or from debt markets (as is the case most often in reduced form 
models).  In the latter case, the corporate bond spread is the main source of data for the 
estimation. However, corporate bond yields combine different types of risk for which investors 
demand compensation. The most discussed component is credit risk, which compensates 
investors for the risk of non-repayment. Another component is interest rate risk, which is 
stripped out in the spread but may nonetheless affect it via call features or prepayment options. 
Corporate bond yields also contain a liquidity premium, which reflects the transaction cost of a 
particular bond. In this paper, we conduct an empirical examination of the pricing of the default 
premium by first decomposing the bond yield into different layers and then examining how the 
liquidity premium and the implied default premium behave. This research thus addresses the 
question of whether the corporate debt market is integrated with the credit protection market and 
of how consistent the pricing of CDS is with the pricing of corporate bonds in Europe
4. 
    Recent empirical literature comparing the CDS spread with the implied default premium from 
corporate bond yields or prices includes Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2003), Hull, Predescu and 
White (2003), Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2004) and Houweling and Vorst (2002). Hull, 
Predescu and White (2003) first regress yield against maturity of all the bonds issued by the 
reference entity to obtain a 5-year bond par yield. They test if the difference between the 5-year 
bond par yield and the 5 -year CDS quote equals the 5-year risk-free rate. The paper suggests 
that the risk-free rate implied from the CDS quotes is between the Treasury rate and the swap 
rate, with 62.87 basis points higher than the Treasury rate and 6.51 basis points lower than the 
swap rate. When controlling the credit quality of the reference entity, counterparty default risk 
provides a partial explanation. They conclude that the results may be influenced by liquidity risk. 
Using a reduced-form model, Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2003) estimate the default parameters 
of the corporate bond model. Substituting these default parameters into the CDS pricing formula 
gives the CDS spread implied by the corporate bond prices. They find that the market CDS 
quotes are significantly less than the spreads implied by the corporate bonds. They interpret the 
difference between the two as the liquidity premium, which is supported by cross-sectional 
                                                 
3 See Merton (1974) or Cossin and Pirotte (2000) for details. 
 
4 As observed by Kwan (2001), the separation of credit risk from liquidity risk is also important for the 
evaluation of current and future economic activity.   2
regressions. To examine the influence of different risk-free rates, they repeat the analysis by 
replacing Treasury rates with swap rates to derive the discount function. This hypothesis can be 
rejected for 48 of the 68 firms in their sample, meaning that the use of the swap curve cannot 
explain the large cross-sectional differences across firms. The empirical results on risk-free rate 
choice are mixed, though there is a clear consensus that liquidity should be a priced item in the 
bond prices
5. 
    This paper differs from previous r esearch in that it decomposes the corporate bond yield 
spread into liquidity and credit risk components first. We compare the default premium implied 
from debt markets to the CDS premium quoted in the credit protection market before and after 
stripping out liquidity. Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2003) extract the liquidity component by 
examining the difference between a pricing model and the market CDS spread, and in this way, 
they assume that the debt market and the credit protection market are perfectly integrated. Our 
approach seeks to identify liquidity as a separate item. By removing the liquidity component, we 
can check to what extent the debt market and the credit protection market are integrated. Our 
approach also differs from those of Hull, Predescu and White (2003) and Houweling and Vorst 
(2002). This article sets out to determine whether liquidity rather than the choice of the risk-free 
rate can explain the pricing discrepancies of the default premium in the corporate debt market 
and the credit protection market. Houweling and Vorst (2002) find an average absolute pricing 
error of 33 basis points using treasury yields and 11 basis points when using swap rates. We find 
a much lower pricing error of 11.6 basis points using treasury yields. After adjusting liquidity in 
bond yields, the absolute pricing error in cross section is almost zero.  
Liquidity is a difficult concept to define, even more so to quantify. Recent empirical literature 
on the liquidity premium includes Janosi, Jarrow and Yildirim (2002), Houweling, Mentink and 
Vorst (2003), Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2003), and Jarrow (2001). In this paper, we implement 
the limited dependent variable model (hereafter the LDV model)  - proposed by Lesmond, 
Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) and extended to fixed-income markets by Chen, Lesmond and Wei 
(2003) - to separate the liquidity premium from bond yields and to estimate a time-varying, 
firm-specific liquidity premium. In general, the LDV model derives the liquidity premium well. 
The cross-sectional mean of the liquidity premium is 11.2 basis points, which is on the low side 
of the liquidity premium found in previous research
6. Our estimate of the mean liquidity 
                                                 
5 See also Brown (2001). 
6 Houweling, Mentink and Vorst (2003) find the liquidity premium ranges from 9 to 24 basis points; Chen, 
Lesmond and Wei (2003) estimate the mean liquidity premium is about 30 basis points. It is not 
surprising to have a lower liquidity premium in our research as the sample firms are the most liquid   3
premium ranges from 2 basis points to 60 basis points. Liquidity is a major driver of the 
difference in prices between the corporate bond market and the credit protection market: When 
the liquidity premium is considered, spread differences fall and these differences are not 
significant anymore for 18 out of 39 firms.  
The bond data used in the LDV estimation is downloaded from Reuters, and consists of daily 
transaction prices on straight corporate bonds from January 1, 2002 to July 23, 2003. In total, 
there are 26,428 daily observations of 124 bonds issued by 39 European companies. The 5-year 
CDS data is taken from Bloomberg. In total there are 8,363 daily observations issued on the 
same 39 reference entities. In the analysis, we first obtain zero-coupon yields from straight 
coupon bonds, transform the zero yields into par yields, then interpolate the par yields to capture 
5-year bond par yields. Following Janosi, Jarrow and Yildirim (2002), we estimate the liquidity 
premium for each bond on each transaction day using a rolling procedure. We take the average 
of the liquidity premium for all bonds issued by the  same firm as a proxy for the liquidity 
premium on a 5-year bond as if the firm has one issue each day. The default premium implied 
from debt prices is compared to the CDS premium quoted in the credit protection market before 
and after stripping out liquidity premium. The comparison is to determine how time-varying 
liquidity plays a role in the pricing of corporate bonds. We then regress the corporate bond yield 
spread against the CDS premium to check how much of the corporate bond yield spread can be 
explai ned by credit risk. As an explaining variable, the liquidity premium is also added in the 
regression to check if it adds explaining power.  
One result that differs from previous research using US data is that the average difference 
between bond spreads and CDS rates
7 is not always positive. Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2004) 
report that two factor may lead CDS prices being greater than the implied yield spread: the CTD 
option and the repo cost. They suggest that CDS is an upper bound on the price of credit risk 
and the implied yield spreads should form a lower bond. For 5 out of the 39 firms, the average 
difference before stripping out liquidity are significantly negative, meaning that, on average, the 
5-year bond par yield spread is lower than the CDS premium quoted in the market for these 5 
firms in the period of the study. After stripping out liquidity, the number of firms with the CDS 
premium higher than the implied bond par yield increases to 14. It is not conclusive that CDS 
prices should always be higher than the implied yield spread due to the liquidity component in 
bond yields. Our results suggest that in peaceful periods, both the repo cost and the CTD option 
                                                                                                                                               
European names. In choosing these bonds for analysis, issued amount and other criteria further constrain 
the chosen bonds to be the most liquid ones. 
7 That is, bond spread minus CDS price.   4
value are not significantly high which reflects the fact that the pricing differences are small. 
Only in the volatile period, especially when default probability increases, the combination of the 
increasing repo cost and the CTD option value may be greater than the liquidity component in 
bond yields, and may lead to CDS prices being greater than the implied yield spreads.  
The regression results show that liquidity is an important component in the bond yield spread. 
T-statistics of the liquidity variable are significant for 35 out of the 39 sample firms. For each 
firm, the root mean squared error decreases and the adjusted R² increases by adding liquidity on 
top of the credit component. However, the influence of liquidity and credit varies for different 
rating groups (as well as for different companies, of course). As the credit quality of the firm 
declines, credit risk becomes the principal explanatory power, while liquidity, though significant, 
decreases in explanatory power. For higher rated firms, the major portion of the yield spread, 
ranging from 60% to 80%, can be explained by the combination of credit and liquidity. For a 
lower rated firm, credit risk alone may explain over 95% of the yield spread. These results on 
credit risk are in line with previous research, such as Huang and Huang (2002), in which credit 
risk accounts for a small portion of the yield spreads on high-rated firms, but a large portion of 
yield spreads on low-rated firms. Our results show that though liquidity adds explaining power, 
an important portion of spreads in high-rated bonds, ranging from 20% to 40%, still remains 
unexplained. By plotting the implied bond par yield and CDS quotes, we observe that the 
divergence period correlates with financial distress or periods of high market uncertainty. We 
explored the factors driving the pricing differences and found that the pricing discrepancies are 
highly correlated and explained by equity volatility. The regression results support both the role 
of the CTD option in European CDS prices and the market imperfection argument. When 
participants in the two markets react differently to the same credit fundamentals, the pricing 
discrepancies provide arbitrage opportunities to sophisticated investors. 
    The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the model that explains the 
relationship between the bond yield spread, the CDS premium and the liquidity premium; 
Section 3 describes the data for the analysis and the estimation procedure; Section 4 examines 
the major results; and Section 5 concludes. 
    2. Liquidity Premium, Bond Yield Spread and CDS Rate 
    In this section, we first discuss various approaches to estimating the liquidity premium and 
validate our choice of the LDV model. Then, we extend Hull, Predescu and White (2003) to 
include liquidity in the non-arbitrage relationship. Further, a simple regression m odel is 
proposed to test the explaining power of the different components of the corporate bond yield 
spread.   5
    2.1 The Liquidity Model 
How to measure liquidity? This research question has frequently been addressed in the 
finance literature. The first strand of literature focuses on the "direct" measures such as bid-ask 
spreads, trade sizes, trade frequencies and volume
8. When "direct" measures are not available, 
researchers tend to resort to "indirect" measures in the analysis. For example, Houweling, 
Mentink and Vorst (2003) examine liquidity pricing using eight indirect measures as follows: 
issued amount, coupon, listed, age, missing prices, price volatility, number of contributors and 
yield dispersion. The third strand of literature has its roots in the adverse selection theory. The 
empirical model started with Rosett (1959). The friction model was then introduced in Maddala 
(1983) as the LDV model. Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) employ the LDV model in the 
estimation of common equity liquidity and Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2003) extend the model to 
study liquidity in corporate bonds. 
    The LDV model assumes that an informed investor will only trade when profits exceed 
transaction costs.
 9 A security with low transaction costs will have more frequent price changes 
than a security with high transaction costs. The logic is that high transaction costs result in fewer 
price movements, therefore more zero returns than low transaction costs. The significance of the 
liquidity effect can be evaluated by observing the incidence of zero returns on a security. Both 
Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) and Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2003) find that liquidity 
measures from the LDV model relate to direct liquidity measures such as the bid-ask spread in 
both the equity and  debt markets. LDV liquidity estimates are indistinguishable from the 
underlying bid-ask spreads and compare well with the trading cost established in previous 
research. The two successful implementations of the LDV model in both the equity and debt 
markets distinguish the LDV model in the liquidity estimation. In this research, we follow Chen, 
Lesmond and Wei (2003) in the estimation of the bond liquidity premium on each transaction 
day. Though other models may also be viable approaches, we choose the LDV model on the 
basis of solid theory and data availability. 
Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2003) model the bond returns as a function of the changes in 
interest rates and changes in the S&P500 index. They choose the two factors based on the 
consensus that high grade bonds are sensitive to changes in both interest rates and general stock 
prices, while low grade bonds are less sensitive to changes in interest rates but more sensitive to 
stock market changes. Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2003) scale both coefficients by the d aily 
                                                 
8 For example, Hong and Warga (2000) study the effective bid-ask spread using exchange-based bond 
transaction data. However more than 90% of bond trades are carried out in the OTC market. 
9 The negative relationship between asset illiquidity costs and trading frequency is the theoretical 
foundation of many papers, for example Amihud (2002).   6
duration of the bonds. We find that scaling changes by daily duration has no significant impact 
on the estimation, and the return process is thus modified to the following equation: 
                      (1) 
where R*j,t is the daily unobserved "true" bond return for bond j at time t,  ßj1 and ßj2 are the 
coefficients of bond j at time t, ?Rt is the daily change of the 10-year risk-free interest rate, 
?StockIndext is the daily return on the stock index.
10 The relationship between the observed 
bond return, the unobserved "true" bond return and the liquidity cost can be stated as Rj,t = R* j,t - 
a
i
j,t, i = 1 or 2, with a
1
j,t as the effective buy side cost, and a
2
j,t as the effective sell side cost for 
bond j. The LDV model imposes the liquidity constraint on the objective function: 








j,t <0 and a
2
j,t >0. The loglikelihood function for this model is: 
                      (3) 
   
 
 
The sum is over the sets 0, 1, 2 of observations for which a
1
j,t =R*j,t = a
2
j,t, R* j,t < a
1
j,t, and R*j,t > 
a
2
j,t. The difference a
*




j,t represents the round-trip transaction costs on bond returns 
normalized by price. In the implementation, the liquidity coefficients  a
2
j,t and  a
1
j,t are 
constrained to make their difference positive. 
    2.2 The Non-Arbitrage Relationship 
    Without considering liquidity risk, corporate bond yield spreads and CDS rates should be 
closely related, as both contain a default and risk premium on the same reference entity. For 
example, Hull and White (2000) state the relationship as follows: 
   Value of Treasury Bond - Value of Corporate Bond = Present Value of Cost of Default, 
if we assume that the default risk is the only difference between a corporate bond and a similar 
Treasury bond. If we denote the bond yield as y, the yield on a similar risk-free bond as r, and 
the CDS spread as  s, the relationship  y – r = s should hold approximately. If the bond yield 
spread y – r is higher than the CDS spread s, debt market participants assume a higher credit risk 
                                                 
10 We use 11 stock indices to represent the European countries involved in the analysis and the subscript 
has been omitted for simplification. 
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than participants in the credit protection market, and buying depressed corporate bonds using 
proceeds from shorting Treasury is profitable. The position can be covered by buying the CDS 
to attain risk-free arbitrage profits. Otherwise, the arbitrage by buying Treasury, shorting bond 
and CDS, is profitable. Pricing discrepancies would give rise to arbitrage opportunities. One 
issue that complicates the arbitrage is the fact that in practice the real payoff of CDS is different 
from the idealized
11. To correct for the difference, Hull and White (2000) and Hull, Predescu 
and White (2003) refine the relationship as: 







ˆ ˆ 1             (4) 
where R ˆ  is the expected recovery rate, A is the expected accrued interest on the reference bond 
at the time of default, and A* is the expected accrued interest on the par yield bond at the time of 
default. In the event of a default, the bond delivered is usually the one with the lowest accrued 
interest, therefore A might be assumed to be zero. Further, A* can be assumed to be equal to y/4 
in Hull, Predescu and White (2003). This assumption is based on the fact that most of the 
corporate bonds in their analysis pay coupons twice a year. The expected accrued interest at the 
time of default is 25% of the par yield. The arbitrage relationship is then simplified to: 







=               (5) 
This relationship holds approximately under many strong assumptions: a flat Treasury yield 
curve, constant interest rates, and the independence of interest rates, default probabilities and 
recovery rates. More significantly, when default happens, the expected accrued interest on the 
reference bond is assumed to be zero, and the expected accrued interest on the par yield bond is 
assumed to be 25% of the par yield. 
    Building on this largely simplified model, we introduce liquidity risk as this component is 
widely recognized.  For example, in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), only 25% of 
the observed credit spread changes can be explained by the numerous credit risk proxies. They 
assume that liquidity might be the single common factor that drives the residuals. As liquidity is 
an indispensable component in the bond yield, if it is ignored, the default premium derived from 
the corporate bond yield is an upward biased measure of the actual risk of default. This notion is 
based on the assumption that liquidity is a positive component in the bond yields.
12 At first sight, 
the credit market is not liquid as many CDS prices do not change over time. Though there might 
                                                 
11 This arbitrage works exactly if the CDS allows the buyer to sell a par yield bond for its face value plus 
accrued interest. 
12 See Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2003), Hong and Warga (2000) and Schultz (2001).   8
a possibility that CDS may be even less liquid than bonds
13, we follow Longstaff, Mithal and 
Neis (2003) and assume that the CDS is contractual in nature and that the CDS spreads reflect 
the default risk component. The CDS price also includes a CTD option and repo costs, which 
entails that the market CDS price is an upward estimate of default risk. However, the size and 
scope of this option is hard to estimate and we do not have reliable data on repo cost. We 
therefore assume that the corporate bond yield, the risk-free rate, bond liquidity and the CDS 
spreads are related through the following equation: 



















          (6) 
where s*t is the 5-year CDS spread quoted in the credit protection market at time t, y*t is the 
implied 5-year bond par yield at time t, r*t is the 5-year risk-free Euro interest rate at time t, n is 
the number of bonds used in the estimation,  a
*
j,t  is the round-trip liquidity premium for a par 
bond j at time t. 
    In this paper, s*t has a 5-year maturity, which is the most common one in the CDS market, 
though it is up to the contractual parties to decide the maturities of the CDS. However, we do 
not see corporate bonds with a fixed maturity of 5 years everyday. The corporate bond par yield 
y*t used in the analysis has to be estimated with a set of bonds with maturities that bracket the 
maturity of the CDS. The estimation of the 5 -year bond par yield  y*t follows three steps: 
Stripping out coupons to obtain zero-coupon bond yields, transforming the zero-coupon bonds 
yield into bond par yields, and interpolating the bond par yield curve to obtain the 5-year bond 
par yields. The risk-free Euro curve could be either the Treasury curve or the swap curve. Hull, 
Predescu and White (2003) argue that the swap curve can bridge the difference between the debt 
and credit markets, citing that the yields on US Treasury bonds tend to be lower compared with 
the yields on other low risk bonds. In this paper, we use the Euro Treasury curve for two reasons: 
First, the debt market regards the corporate yield spread as the spread of the corporate bond 
yield over the yield of a government bond; second, there is no consensus whether the factors 
leading to a depressed US Treasury curve would have the same effect on the Euro Treasury 
curve. For each firm, the number of bonds used in the estimation varies, ranging from 2 to 7, 
with an average of 3. We allow the liquidity premium to be a time-varying variable to reflect the 
changing transaction cost of a particular bond. The average liquidity premium for all bonds 
issued by the same firm is a proxy for the transaction cost of the implied 5 -year bond. The 
expected accrued interest on the par yield bond at the time of default is approximated by y*t /2, 
                                                 
13 the LDV model does not work well with quotes and we do not have transaction data on CDS 
transaction prices.     9
as most of the European bonds in the analysis pay coupons once a year. Though, in reality, the 
accrued interest could be any portion of  y*t, we take the yearly average of 50% for 
simplification. By stripping out the liquidity component in the bond yield spread, we expect that 
the credit component implied from the bond market should be more closely related to the CDS 
spread quoted in the credit market. 
    We then consider to what extent the corporate bond spread as determined by the bond 
markets correlates to the CDS rate determined by the credit protection market. The first 
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where y*t  is the implied 5-year bond par yield at time t, r*t is the 5-year risk-free Euro rate at 
time t, and s*t  is the 5-year CDS spread quoted in the credit protection market at time t. Further, 
for robustness, we investigate whether adding the liquidity component increases the explaining 
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    For ease of interpretation, we group firms by ratings. Summary statistics of the distribution of 
coefficient estimates are presented in Table 3. The S&P ratings (AA, A, BBB, BB, B) are 
chosen to replicate the credit quality of each borrower in the period of the study. We expect that 
by adding the liquidity component, the second regression should increase the overall explaining 
power. We also expect that the two components play specific roles in different rating groups. 
    The pricing of credit risk in the two markets is not expected to be perfect all time. A 
meaningful research result is to know the true driver of the pricing differences. For example, if 
the CTD option is priced in CDS prices, then the driver of the CTD option value – the riskiness 
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We expect to know if high equity volatility - that is, a high CTD option value in CDS prices -  
would consequently drive up s*t above 
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, the implied bond par yield. 
    3. Data and Estimation 
    In this section, we discuss the data used. We also detail the implementation procedure and 
some preliminary statistical results. 
•  Credit Default Swaps   10
    We download the daily 5-year CDS last prices for 180 liquid European reference entities from 
Bloomberg for the period starting on January 1, 2002 and ending on July 23, 2003. Bloomberg 
uses Morgan Stanley as a data source for CDS prices. Each quote contains information such as 
the transaction date, the reference entity and the price. The CDS price is the midpoint of bid-ask 
quotations. As pointed out by Hull, Predescu and White (2003), a confirmed quote from a dealer 
is a firm commitment to trade a minimum notional of US$ 10 million. Thus the CDS last price 
represents the market price for the credit risk of the borrower. When downloading the data, we 
choose not to carry over the price if there was no trading or quotation on that day. In this way, 
the non-trading days are excluded from the analysis. We double check the reference names with 
the names included in the JECI-100 index linked notes, which are issued by BNP Paribas and 
JPMorgan Chase on the credit exposure of the 100 most liquid and diversified European entities. 
From these two samples, we identify 39 reference names
14 that have issued a sufficient number 
of Euro-denominated bonds. 
The daily CDS quotes were scanned for data errors. We do observe abnormality in the data 
set, though overall the data was reliable. On February 26, 2003, the CDS price for Ahold was 
1,000 basis points, and the next day the price dropped to 35 basis points. Further, on May 19, 
2003, the CDS price rose from 17 basis points two days earlier to 550 basis points. In such cases, 
the CDS prices for the abnormal period were  deleted. The study period saw the most dramatic 
turbulence in the European credit protection market. Many reference entities experienced credit 
decline, especially autos and telecoms. In our finding results, the majority of quotes lay between 
10 and 700 basis points, with the two big movers Ahold and KPN reaching 1,000 basis points. 
The average of the CDS quotes for all reference entities is 106 basis points. The summary 
statistics of the CDS are given in Table 1. Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the CDS 
premium, which varies across ratings. 
•  Corporate Bonds 
    The bond data are crucial in the estimation of the default premium as well as of the liquidity 
premium. For each of the 180 reference entities, we download the bond characteristics of each 
issue from Reuters 3000Xtra. The Reuters search criteria are strictly monitored. First, there have 
to be at least two issues denominated in Euro; Second, there have be at least one bond with 
maturity lying between January 1, 2004 and July 23, 2008 and another with maturity lying 
between July 23, 2008 and December 30, 2011; In this way the interpolation of two issues could 
bracket the tenor of the 5-year CDS in the sample; Third, bonds are straight bonds with fixed 
                                                 
14 Regarding the number of reference names, Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2003) study 68 names, Hull, 
Predescu and White (2003) examine 34 names, and Janosi, Jarrow and Yildirim (2002) analyze 15 names, 
all firms are US based. Our sample size is comparable with previous research.   11
annual coupons and an amount outstanding over 100 million Euros; Fourth, bonds have to be 
rated by recognized rating agencies, listed on an exchange and not be a private placement; Fifth, 
bonds could not be included in a sinking fund, indexed, partially paid with multiple steps or 
currencies; Sixth, bonds could not embed any call or put option, or be convertible. T he 
screening significantly reduces the number of suitable bonds and borrowers. Further, each issue 
was scanned using Reuters Bond Credit model and subordinated debts were therefore identified 
and excluded from the sample. We then use Reuters Excel Add-in PowerPlus Pro to download 
time series data for all the bond issues. Bond issues without a recognizable RIC code are 
excluded from the sample. We choose to download the "Last Trade" close price
15 for each 
transaction day. The bond prices were also scanned for errors. In our research, the LDV model 
requires a sufficient number of non-zero returns to estimate the liquidity parameters. If there are 
too many missing data points or the number of zero returns is too high, the bond issue is deleted 
from the sample. After all the screening procedures, we have a sample of 124 qualified bonds 
issued by 39 corporations. For comparison as well as to test the strength of the bond transaction 
data, we also download bond data from Datastream. The bond prices from Datastream are the 
daily clean price. We use both bond data sets to check if transaction data provides more accurate 
estimates. 
•  Risk-Free Rate, Stock Market Indices and Implied Put Volatility 
    Euro government curves are provided by Pictet. The government bonds used in the 
bootstrapping procedure are those included in the JPMorgan EMU government bond index. The 
bonds are straight bonds with fixed coupon rates. Following a standard bootstrapping and 
interpolation procedure, on each transaction day we observe both 5-year and 10-year risk-free 
Euro rates. The 5-year government curve is used as a proxy for the risk-free rate, and changes in 
the 10-year curve are used in the LDV model and maximum likelihood estimation. We record 
MSCI country indices for the 11 European stock markets from Datastream. Like the 10-year 
risk-free curve, changes in stock market indices are used for maximum likelihood estimation. 
Implied put volatility data are taken from Bloomberg for 29 firms. The volatility data are used in 
the analysis of the pricing differences between debt and credit markets. The period of risk-free 
rates, stock indices and implied put volatility corresponds to the period of the CDS sample. 
•  Estimation of Corporate Bond Par Yield 
    For each transaction day, we first obtain zero-coupon bond yields from straight coupon bonds 
issued by the same firm using a bootstrapping procedure. We then transform the zero yields 
                                                 
15 In a conversation with Reuters people, they confirmed that last trade close prices are the last transaction 
prices of the day verified by dealers.   12
obtained into bond par yields. By regressing against maturity along the bond par yield curve, we 
obtain a 5-year bond par yield y*t implied from traded debt prices. 
•  Estimation of Liquidity Premium 
    To estimate the liquidity premium for each bond on each transaction day, we follow Janosi, 
Jarrow and Yildirim (2002) using a rolling procedure. For each day in the bond observation 
period, we calculate bond daily returns from bond prices. The corresponding daily changes in 
the 10-year interest rate and stock index are also calculated. For each CDS trading day, we go 





j,t for that bond on that particular day. Thus, each liquidity estimate incorporates 
information from the past 112 transaction prices. The estimation requires maximizing the 
loglikelihood function of equation (3), using bond returns, changes in interest rates and stock 






j,t, which is 
normalized by price. In the estimation, if both intercept coefficients are negative, we add the two 









j,t. The liquidity estimate is 
then constrained to be positive. We rescale the transaction costs by the bond's par value to 
represent the liquidity premium of a par yield bond. After estimating and normalizing 








a  as a proxy for the liquidity premium on a 5-year bond, as if the firm has one issue 
each day. 
    The summary statistics for the liquidity premium are provided in Table 2. The majority of 
liquidity premiums lay between 0.3 and 70 basis points, with the two big exceptions of Ahold 
and KPN again exceeding 200 basis points. The average of the liquidity premium for all 
reference entities is 11.2 basis points. An interesting correlation between the market CDS 
premium and the liquidity premium can be viewed in Table 3. For AA firms, the CDS price is 
negatively correlated with the liquidity premium; a decreasing CDS price or increasing credit 
quality couples with increasing liquidity premium. We find the same negative relationship exists 
for the 15 A-rated firms, though the correlation coefficient increases from -0.2322 to -0.1864. 
The correlation between credit and liquidity reverses starting with BBB-rated firms. For these 
18 firms, the average correlation is 0.2106, meaning that decreasing credit quality leads to a 
higher liquidity premium. The effect is more pronounced when credit quality declines further, 
with BB-rated firms having a correlation of 0.7169 and B -rated firms one of 0.9104. This 
phenomenon agrees with the theoretical predictions that transaction  costs are significantly 
higher at the two ends. High-rated bonds tend to fall into the hands of institutional investors who   13
hold the position until maturity. When credit quality declines to the speculative level, sellers 
cannot liquidate their positions, simply because they cannot find buyers of distressed bonds in 
the market. Both ends lead to high transaction costs which is supported by the liquidity premium 
derived from the LDV model. 
    4. Results 
    We compare the default premium implied from debt prices to the CDS premium quoted in the 
credit protection market before and after stripping out the liquidity premium. Since the CDS 
prices are not carried over non-trading days, we clean the bond par yields implied, liquidity and 
the 5-year risk-free rate to make the three time series correspond to the CDS in calendar dates. 
Using equation (6), we strip out risk-free and liquidity components from the implied bond par 
yield  y*t, rescale it to remove the influence of accrued interest, and obtain a 5 -year default 
premium implied from the debt market. The implied default premium series is therefore 
compared with the CDS quotes in the credit protection market, and the differences are given in 
the analysis. We regress corporate bond yield spread against the CDS premium to see how much 
of the corporate-Treasury spread could be explained by credit risk. We add liquidity as an 
explaining variable to see if by doing so the overall explaining power improved. We also 
explore the changes of the CTD option value in driving the pricing differences in a volatile 
market. The results are detailed in this section. 
    4.1 How Are Debt Markets and Credit Markets Related When Stripping out Liquidity? 















are reported in Table 4. The statistics include the industry, ratings, 
mean of the difference, associated t -statistics, the minimum and maximum values of the 
difference, and the correlation of the two series. The hypothesis testing for the difference in 
means of the two samples is also given in the table. If the result is 1, we can reject the null 
hypothesis of zero mean at the 0.01 significance level. 
    Unlike previous research using US data, we find that the average difference is not all positive 
for the 39 firms. The default premium implied from debt prices is not always greater than the 
market CDS premium. In theory, there is always a positive liquidity component in the corporate 
bond yield, which leads to higher yield, lower price, and higher default premium implied from 
debt prices than otherwise. However, our study of European data shows this is not the case for 
all firms, which leads to the role of the CTD option imbedded in the contract to be discussed in 
Section 4.3. 
    The average differences between debt and credit markets range from -48 basis points to 51 
basis points. The mean of the average differences is 11.6 basis points. These results show that   14
on average the CDS price is less than the default premium implied from bond prices; the 
differences vary significantly across all firms. The same conclusion can be seen from the 
maximum and minimum differences  - on average, the minimum value is  -55.1 and the 
maximum value is 54.1. The European result shows smaller differences compared with 
Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2003), in which the cross-sectional mean of the average differences 
is 60.8 basis points. We also test the differences in means of the two series. At 0.01 significance 
level, we can reject the null hypothesis of zero mean for 28 out of the 39 firms. The implied 
default premium 









- is also highly correlated with the CDS premium  s*t. The lowest 
correlation between the two series is 0.29 and the highest 0.99, with an average correlation of 
0.81. 
    Then we test if stripping out liquidity component would cause the average differences to 
change. The comparison is to determine how time-varying liquidity plays a role in the pricing of 
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and the summary statistics are presented in Table 5.
16 The mean of the 
average differences is 0.7 basis points. In the test of the differences in means, the null 
hypothesis that the mean is zero can be rejected for 21 out o f the 39 firms. The average of t-
statistics decreases from 7.7 to 3.3 and the majority of the firms
17 have t-statistics smaller than 
ten in absolute value. Interestingly enough, without using a different risk-free curve, we show 
that the average differences can be reduced by adjusting the liquidity component. Note that the 
cross-sectional variation in differences across firms cannot be eliminated completely by 
adjusting liquidity. The variation is likely to be firm-specific due to the CTD option imbedded in 
the CDS prices. In Figure 1, we observe clearly from the Akzo Nobel graph, that the default 
premium implied is higher than the CDS premium, but after adjusting liquidity, the difference 
between the default premium implied and the CDS premium is almost indistinguishable from 
September 30, 2002 to March 30, 2003, on a daily basis. 
    4.2 How Much of the Corporate-Treasury Yield Spread Can Be Explained by Credit 
Risk and Liquidity Risk? 
    To test the significance of the credit component in bond spreads, we regress the spreads on 




* * e + ￿ + = - t t t s b a r y . As shown, the CDS premium is significantly positively related to the 
yield spread, meaning that as the CDS premium increases, the bond yield spread increases as 
                                                 
16 A summary of the pricing differences by ratings is given in Table 6. 
17 30 of the 39 firms in the sample.   15
well. We also group the estimated coefficients by ratings in Table 9. From Table 9, b1 increases 
from 0.5244 for AA-rated firms to 1.2139 for B-rated firms, and the associated t-statistics also 
increase from 16.2 to 92. The trend along the ratings is almost linear for both the coefficients 
and the t-statistics. As credit quality declines, the credit component increases its significance 
which can also be observed through the increases in R². The R² for AA-rated firms is 0.5131, 
increasing to 0.9760 for B-rated firm. This means that the credit component alone explains 
almost 100% of the yield spread for low-rated firms. 
    To test the liquidity component as a priced item in the bond yields, we regress the CDS 
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c s b a r y . The results are presented in Table 8. Of all 39 firms, 
only 4 show that the liquidity component is not significant, which confirms the notion that our 
estimate of liquidity is a priced item in corporate bond yields. In terms of adjusted R², adding the 
liquidity component always adds explaining power, though the improvement varies. In Table 9, 
we show that for investment grade bonds, liquidity adds more explaining power. For AA-rated 
firms, the adjusted R² increases from 0.51 to 0.57; for A-rated firms, the adjusted R² increases 
from 0.65 to 0.72; for BBB-rated firms, the adjusted R² increases from 0.78 to 0.80. 
    Various previous research
18 use indirect credit variables in the regression and their results 
show that credit risk accounts for a small portion of corporate bond yield spread. Using the 
direct credit variable of CDS prices
19 in the regression, we confirm that credit risk might 
account for a larger portion of yield spread for low-rated firms. For high-rated firms, we find 
that the explained portion by credit risk is higher than 50%. The unexplained portion for AA 
firms is 49%, for A firms it is 35%, and for BBB firms 23%. Though Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein 
and Martin (2001) predict that liquidity has the potential to be the common factor driving the 
unexplained portion, it is not evident in our analysis. The fact is that liquidity does improve the 
explaining power, but, the unexplained portion of 20% to 40% still remains. We can explain this 
finding with the segmentation of the credit and the debt markets and the existence of the CTD 
option in the CDS prices. When great credit uncertainty casts a shadow over the future of a 
company, investors in different markets tend to trade on incomplete information. In the case of 
France Telecom, the fear of default drives up both the CDS price and the CTD option value, and 
debt prices - though more volatile - follow suit, but not all bond prices decline to the same level. 
                                                 
18 For example, Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), Huang and Kong (2003) and Eom, 
Helwege and Huang (2003). 
 
19 The CDS price is not a pure measure of credit risk because the CTD option and the repo rate are 
included in the pricing.   16
    4.3 What Drives CDS Prices Higher than the Bond Premium? 
    In practice, the market price of a bond immediately after default is usually lower than the 
amount to be recovered. Because of the lack of a fair market price, CDS traders favor a physical 
settlement in which one puts the reference bond or a pari passu bond to the seller and gets par. 
The choice of available bonds for physical delivery after default gives the protection buyer a 
CTD option. The option should be priced in the CDS price. Thus, when some of the qualified 
bonds are much cheaper than the rest, the CTD option becomes more valuable, which drives up 
the CDS prices. Another factor that drives up the CDS price is the repo cost. In a perfect market, 
selling protection and shorting the bond form an arbitrage position. Without the convenience of 
owning the bond, the arbitrage has to be carried out by borrowing the bond which incurs the 
repo cost. The repo cost is then transferred in the protection price quoted. In that sense, the sum 
of the credit component, the CTD option and the repo cost in the CDS prices might exceed the 
sum of the liquidity premium and the credit component implied from the traded bonds. 
    A closer examination of the 5 firms with CDS prices higher than the implied bond par yield 
shows that 3 firms were downgraded in this period, and the other firms were on the verge of 
being downgraded. In Figure 2, the daily series graph of France Telecom shows that the two 
series closely resemble each other before and after the credit turmoil. Only i n the period of 
severe distress and speculation, the CTD option is deeply in the money. However, when the 
scope of deliverable assets is restricted by the contract, the CTD option value is greatly reduced. 
European CDS contracts are less restricted, and we observe 5 firms whose CDS prices are 
higher than the corresponding bond par yield spread. On the other hand, the US CDS prevents 
the delivery of very long-dated bonds, which might partially explain why none of the CDS 
prices are higher in previous research using US data. 
    The CTD argument is not easy to prove because of the difficulty in estimating the size of the 
individual option value. Inspired by the plotting of the market CDS quotes and the par bond 
yield series, we tend to believe that the pricing differences are closely linked to the uncertainty 
in the firm's financial performance, which is naturally linked to the CTD value. If there is huge 
uncertainty in the firm's creditworthiness, the expected recovery rate tends to be very low for 
certain bonds qualifiable for delivery, thus the CTD option becomes valuable given the pricing 
divergences across bonds. When a direct test is not possible due to the lack of the necessary data 
to derive the CTD value, we opt for an indirect test of the CTD option impact on the pricing 
differences. 
In this section, we test if market uncertainty as approximated by the implied equity volatility 




























.  s*t is the implied put volatility series 
corresponding to the implied bond par yields and CDS quotes. The results are presented in Table 
10. Of the 29 firms for which we have implied put volatility data, 27 show a negative 
relationship, meaning that the higher the volatility, the higher the CDS quote over the implied 
bond par yield. Of the 27 negative coefficient firms, 20 show that volatility is significant in 
explaining the credit risk pricing differences in the two markets, with  t-statistics average of  -
10.449. R² varies across the firms, with the lowest near zero and the highest over 60%. The 
relationship between market uncertainty and the pricing difference is plotted in Figure 3, using 
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 is negatively correlated to the market uncertainty. 
    In the previous section, we found that the unexplained portion of the pricing differences 
remains after considering the liquidity premium in bond prices and credit risk. To explore the 
factor driving the pricing differences, we consider the existence of the CTD option embedded in 
the CDS quotes and its impact on the pricing differences. Using the implied volatility as a proxy 
for the CTD option value, we found t hat the CTD option is a significant factor driving the 
pricing differences. As implied volatility increases, the CDS price becomes higher than the 
implied bond par yield. The relationship also confirms the role of the CTD option in the CDS 
prices. Given the near linear relationship between the credit, debt and equity markets, the 
question will be: Can money be made on this three-way relationship? 
    4.4 Is Arbitrage Possible? 
    The credit protection market differs from the corporate debt market in many ways. First, the 
CDS is contractual, which allows hedge funds to enter margin trading and leverage up. The 
same group of investors do not necessarily trade bonds in the cash market. Second, the 
protection buyer can choose from a set of bonds or loans to deliver in the case of a physical 
settlement, while the exact CTD option value is unknown. Third, the bond investors with a large 
investment tend to buy and hold, which makes the market less liquid. Fourth, in he event of 
default, the CDS pays par minus a recovery rate, while a bond may pay the market price less the 
recovery rate. With all these differences, are there arbitrage opportunities to be exploited? 
    The answer lies in the transaction costs. For example, to exploit the pricing discrepancies 
between the CDS and bond yields in the case of France Telecom, the most possible action is to 
short both CDS and corporate bonds when the two markets diverge. Shorting distressed 
corporate bonds involves significant transaction costs. First of all, the arbitrage position can   18
only be established with the right bonds. Some particular bonds might incorporate all the credit 
information and show no significant divergence from the CDS prices. Besides, CDS prices link 
only indirectly to bond prices because of the different natures of the two instruments. Second, 
the appropriate bonds may take time to locate
20. The bonds to be shorted should first be located 
and borrowed. If the necessary bonds cannot be located and borrowed at short notice, the 
investment window may disappear
21. Third, lending fees or repo rates may be significantly high 
if the lender expects to profit from lending the bonds in the future. Repo spreads may be much 
larger when the issuing firm is in financial distress. Bond lenders may wish to liquidate their 
positions anytime in the near future, and lending bonds out could definitely delay the process. In 
return, they charge a higher rate for lending and delay. For example, the 8 European reference 
entities in J.P. Morgan (2002) had an average repo rate of 67 basis points on August 16, 2002. 
Fourth, the arbitrage period cannot be predetermined. It may take months or years for the CDS 
prices and bond yields to converge. With changes in the market, bond lenders may opt out. If the 
borrowers fail to borrow and replace, so-called short squeezes may incur additional costs plus 
the collapse of the arbitrage positions. Furthermore, as observed in the credit market, the CDS 
bid-ask spread gets larger in credit turmoil. All in all, transaction costs and uncertainties make 
arbitrage more difficult. As observed in J.P. Morgan (2002): “In practice, however, it is seldom 
possible to borrow and short the bond due to liquidity constraints and the particular positive 
basis
22 is thus not realizable.” The paper profit may not be realized and the arbitrage deal could 
be transformed into an uncovered risky one-side position. 
    4.5 Transaction Data vs. Alternative Data 
    We find that using transaction data can greatly increase the accuracy of transaction costs 
estimations. As an a lternative to transaction data, we download the same bond prices from 
Datastream.
23 The two data sets are fundamentally different as prices from Reuters are the last 
trade prices in any transaction day confirmed by dealers, while prices from Datastream are clean 
prices, and it cannot be verified if they are calculated or actual trade prices. However, not all the 
bonds identified on Reuters can be found on Datastream, we therefore have a smaller sample 
size of 116 bonds issued by 38 firms. 
                                                 
20 As explained in Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2002). 
21 J.P. Morgan (2002) reports that a France Telecom bond had a high basis but it was not supplied for repo 
on August 16, 2002. 
22 Here the basis is defined as the CDS minus the asset swap spread on a comparable cash instrument. 
23 Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2003) use bond data from Datastream.   19
    We implement the same liquidity estimation using the new data set, then investigate the 






e a ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + = -
n
t j t t t n
c s b a r y . Although not 
shown in the paper, we find that liquidity estimates are not significant
24 for 16 out of 38 firms. 
Recall that using Reuters transaction data, only 4 out of 39 firms are not significant. In terms of 
R², liquidity does not add as much explaining power as using transaction data. The difference 
signifies the importance of using transaction data in the liquidity estimation. 
    5. Conclusions 
    In this paper, we have tested the dynamic relationship between the liquidity premium, the 
corporate bond spread and the CDS rate using transaction data on 39 European firms. Using 
transaction data increases the estimation accuracy. With various tests, we have also proved that 
the LDV model is a valid model in determining the liquidity premium. The formula developed 
by Hull, Predescu and White (2003), which approximates the relationship between corporate 
bond yield spread and the market CDS premium by adjusting the accrued interest, is also well 
grounded. Further, results in this paper probe many untouched areas or unsettled issues in credit 
research. 
    First, the daily correlation of the CDS and liquidity follows a linear trend along credit ratings. 
Various research finds that transaction costs are significantly higher at the two ends. 
Institutional investors tend to hold high-grade bonds to maturity, and low-grade bonds are less 
liquid due to thin trading in the market. However, the notion cannot be readily proved since 
liquidity is a concept hard to estimate accurately. With the LDV model, we were able to 
estimate the daily liquidity premium for each bond which can be compared with the daily CDS 
premium. Our data crunch shows that for AA firms, the CDS premium is negatively correlated 
with liquidity risk with a coefficient of -0.2322, and the same negative relationship continues for 
A-rated firms. The correlation between CDS and liquidity reverses starts with BBB-rated firms. 
The effect is more pronounced when credit quality declines further, with BB-rated firms having 
a correlation of 0.7169 and B -rated firms are of 0.9104. The fine linear relationship can be 
applied to the trading of individual bonds. 
    Second, after adjusting the accrued interest, the difference between the default premium 
implied from bond prices and the CDS premium is very small. Using US data, both Hull, 
Predescu and White (2003) and Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2003) report that the average 
difference is around 60 basis points. Our results show that in the EMU market, the difference is 
about 12 basis points. Our difference estimate is lower because of the negative differences that 
                                                 
24 At the same 0.01 significance level.   20
appeared in the sample compared with the other research, which finds only positive differences. 
We also find that the CDS prices can be 300 basis points higher than the implied bond par yields 
when the firm under study is in severe financial distress. Investigation of individual firms 
demonstrates that before and after the credit turmoil, the differences are small; only during the 
distressed period is the CDS premium much higher than the default premium implied. Our 
results confirm the fact that the EMU credit and debt markets are integrated only in peaceful 
periods. When the market is plagued with incomplete information, participants in the different 
markets tend to act irrationally by misreading the same fundamentals. 
    Third, after stripping out the liquidity layer from the bond yield spread, we find that on 
average the differences between the default premium implied and the CDS premium are even 
smaller than 1 basis points. Previous research proposes using the swap curve instead of the 
Treasury curve as the risk-free rate in the estimation of the default premium. Our research shows 
that we can achieve the same effect by stripping out liquidity. Using the swap rate in our 
analysis would only make the differences even bigger in absolute terms. However, the cross-
sectional variation in differences cannot be eliminated completely by adjusting liquidity. The 
variation is likely to be firm-specific, induced by the changes in the CTD option value or the 
segmentation of the credit protection and debt markets. 
    Fourth, by regressing the liquidity premium and the CDS premium on the bond yield spread, 
we confirm previous research that credit risk accounts for almost 100% of the bond yield spread 
for low-rated firms. For high-rated firms, credit risk alone explains more than 50% of the spread. 
Our analysis shows that, though adding liquidity does improve explaining power, about 20% to 
40% of the investment grade bond yield spread cannot be explained by the combination of 
liquidity and credit risk. A natural explanation for this gap is the segmentation of the EMU 
credit and debt markets. The CTD option value varies and its changes are unrelated to either 
credit or liquidity component. 
    Fifth, the pricing differences are highly correlated with the CTD option as approximated by 
the implied put volatility. By regressing the implied put volatility on the pricing difference 
between the debt and credit markets, we confirm that the pricing differences are particularly 
driven by the riskiness of a company. The sign of the volatility coefficients also confirms the 
role of a CTD option in CDS prices. The higher the market uncertainty, the greater the CDS 
price over implied bond par yield. 
    Sixth, given the near linear relationship between the credit, debt and equity markets, arbitrage 
is possible only if transaction costs are seriously considered. Market volatility not only increases 
the correlation between the three markets but also adds transaction costs as witnessed by the   21
increased bid-ask spread, high repo rate and low transaction volume. The possibility of 
"squeeze" and basis risk may drive the spread toward an irrational level for a prolonged period 
and incur losses not predicted by theoretical models.   22
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Table 1 Summary Statistics for CDS Premium in the Credit Market  
This table presents statistics for the market CDS premium for the sample firms. N stands for the 
number of daily observations. The CDS premiums are in basis points.  
 
Industry Country Company Rating Mean Min. Max. Std.Dev. N Bonds
Autos Germany BMW A 34 25 55 6.3 238 4
Germany Volkswagen A 67 55 90 6.4 111 4
Sweden Volvo A 65 40 80 12.3 167 5
Germany/US DaimlerChrysler A/BBB 131 86 164 18.139 204 5
Basic industry Germany Siemens AA 51 30 94 14.8 176 3
Netherlands Akzo Nobel A 51 26 85 14.4 249 2
Germany Bayer A 91 50 255 38.1 194 2
Germany Linde A 54 35 95 12.2 196 2
France Saint Gobain A 110 51 225 42.2 178 3
Sweden Investor BBB 111 37 211 47.4 254 2
France Lafarge BBB 97 60 148 24.5 241 4
Germany Thyssenkrupp BBB 182 110 370 64.0 174 2
UK Rolls-Royce BBB 120 24 283 59.4 201 2
Germany HeidelbergCement BBB/BB 290 88 515 133.6 277 2
Financial Netherlands ABN AMRO AA 25 14 56 10.2 224 3
Netherlands ING AA 24 15 43 6.5 230 6
Spain BSCH A 68 27 105 22.3 140 4
Germany Dresdner A 48 16 85 16.3 177 7
Italy Banca Monte A 31 20 45 9.6 96 3
Food/Beverage UK Allied Domecq BBB 66 43 110 14.6 140 3
UK BAT A/BBB 87 60 185 25.2 210 3
UK Gallaher BBB 90 65 122 14.6 224 2
Retail France Casino BBB 142 70 220 45.4 221 4
France LVMH BBB 118 60 191 33.5 226 4
Netherlands Ahold BBB/BB/B 201 76 1000 139.7 180 5
Telecoms/Media Italy Olivetti BBB 177 80 285 53.7 172 2
Portugal Portugal Telecom A 83 39 171 32.6 317 2
Finland Sonera BBB/A 54 35 65 8.1 139 2
Spain Telefonica A 103 33 256 58.3 289 3
Netherlands Wolters Kluwer A/BBB 79 55 116 14.9 100 3
Germany Deutsche Telek. A/BBB 236 96 401 67.8 217 3
France France Telecom BBB 261 81 641 132.0 465 3
Netherlands KPN BBB 255 48 993 208.4 485 4
Denmark TDC A/BBB 87 60 115 11.7 181 3
Utilities/Energy France Total AA 24 18 29 4.4 215 3
France Suez A 94 67 160 23.9 157 2
Sweden Vattenfall A 52 35 81 12.3 175 3
Spain Endesa A/BBB 64 34 161 32.1 269 2
Spain Repsol BBB 238 50 544 158.0 254 3
Average 106.6 49.0 226.8 42.3 214 3    25
Table 2 Summary Statistics for the Liquidity Premium from Bond Prices  
This table presents descriptive statistics for the liquidity premium (in basis points) derived by 
the LDV model. Corr. is the correlation coefficient of the daily market CDS prices and the 
estimated liquidity premiums.   
 
Industry Company Rating Mean Min. Max. Std.Dev. N Corr. Bonds
Autos BMW A 5.0 1.7 11.0 2.8 238 -0.09 4
Volkswagen A 3.0 2.2 3.6 0.4 111 0.15 4
Volvo A 8.4 1.5 23.6 7.7 167 -0.26 5
DaimlerChrysler A/BBB 6.2 1.9 13.0 3.9 204 0.41 5
Basic industry Siemens AA 2.7 1.4 3.7 0.6 176 0.47 3
Akzo Nobel A 28.1 11.4 45.4 8.0 249 -0.50 2
Bayer A 5.0 2.3 8.7 2.1 194 0.21 2
Linde A 9.2 4.2 19.8 4.7 196 -0.18 2
Saint Gobain A 7.0 2.6 13.7 2.1 178 -0.40 3
Investor BBB 7.7 2.8 21.8 4.2 254 0.81 2
Lafarge BBB 4.3 2.2 10.1 1.6 241 -0.08 4
Thyssenkrupp BBB 8.5 2.7 16.0 4.1 174 0.52 2
Rolls-Royce BBB 9.0 3.3 19.0 3.8 201 0.52 2
HeidelbergCement BBB/BB 9.4 4.1 20.3 3.9 277 0.72 2
Financial ABN AMRO AA 3.2 0.7 12.0 2.9 224 -0.12 3
ING AA 3.8 1.9 8.5 1.5 230 -0.43 6
BSCH A 8.9 3.4 13.9 3.3 140 0.52 4
Dresdner A 4.0 1.7 6.8 1.4 177 -0.23 7
Banca Monte A 28.8 19.5 35.3 4.1 96 0.44 3
Food/Beverage Allied Domecq BBB 2.7 0.3 6.7 1.8 140 -0.64 3
BAT A/BBB 7.0 2.3 20.0 4.5 210 -0.14 3
Gallaher BBB 4.2 0.4 21.0 5.1 224 0.33 2
Retail Casino BBB 10.2 1.2 36.2 9.7 221 0.32 4
LVMH BBB 5.3 1.4 15.5 4.2 226 -0.23 4
Ahold BBB/BB/B 47.6 22.3 230.3 46.0 180 0.91 5
Telecoms/Media Olivetti BBB 6.5 2.4 23.2 3.8 172 -0.84 2
Portugal Telecom A 5.4 0.9 17.7 3.1 317 -0.46 2
Sonera BBB/A 2.4 0.9 3.4 0.5 139 -0.66 2
Telefonica A 6.3 2.4 13.6 2.5 289 -0.42 3
Wolters Kluwer A/BBB 60.4 47.9 71.9 6.0 100 0.03 3
Deutsche Telek. A/BBB 8.2 5.5 12.8 1.6 217 0.41 3
France Telecom BBB 19.6 4.3 44.6 10.0 465 0.76 3
KPN BBB 48.0 3.3 200.2 58.8 485 0.56 4
TDC A/BBB 5.0 3.3 7.4 1.1 181 0.07 3
Utilities/Energy Total AA 4.3 0.4 11.8 3.1 215 -0.85 3
Suez A 7.2 1.8 26.0 8.1 157 -0.19 2
Vattenfall A 3.5 1.9 4.8 0.8 175 -0.72 3
Endesa A/BBB 6.5 1.6 17.9 4.9 269 0.71 2
Repsol BBB 16.4 3.4 33.8 5.3 254 0.27 3
Average 11.2 4.6 28.8 6.3 214 0.04 3    26
Table 3 Summary of Market CDS Premium and Estimated Liquidity Premium by Ratings  
Both the CDS premium and the liquidity premium implied increase when credit quality declines 
as approximated by ratings. Standard deviation follows the same trend with the exception of 
BB-rated firm. The correlation coefficients state the relationship between the market CDS 
premium and the corresponding liquidity premium. For AA firms, the CDS premium is 
negatively correlated with liquidity risk with a coefficient of -0.2322, and the same negative 
relationship continues to A-rated firms. The correlation between credit and liquidity reverses 
from BBB-rated firms. The effect is more pronounced when credit quality declines further, with 
BB-rated firms having a correlation of 0.7169 and B-rated firms one of 0.9104.  
 
Rating Mean Min. Max. Std.Dev. N Firms Corr.
Panel A: CDS premium summary
AA 31.123 19.25 55.25 8.966525 845 4
A 66.8652 36.83333 123.5 21.01803 2823 15
BBB 141.1084 62.05556 292.1111 56.95639 4238 18
BB 290.31 87.5 515 133.6 277 1
B 200.74 76 1000 139.71 180 1
Panel B: Liquidity premium summary
AA 3.490075 1.11325 8.9881 2.027958 845 4 -0.23218
A 8.800533 3.903793 16.49401 3.439891 2823 15 -0.18637
BBB 13.09671 5.018522 32.83518 7.47485 4238 18 0.210566
BB 9.375 4.0865 20.34 3.8712 277 1 0.71688
B 47.6 22.274 230.27 45.993 180 1 0.91035  
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Table 4 The Difference between Default Premiums Implied and CDS Prices  














the bond yield spread is rescaled to remove the  influence of 
accrued interest. The correlation coefficients state the relationship between the default premiums 
implied and the market CDS prices. 
  
Industry Company Rating Mean t-statistic Min. Max. Corr. Rj/Ac N
Autos BMW A 5.8 10.8 -15.1 27.2 0.29 1 238
Volkswagen A 1.5 1.5 -14.4 14.6 0.55 0 111
Volvo A 20.3 15.0 3.0 33.9 0.87 1 167
DaimlerChrysler A/BBB -13.8 -8.1 -44.62 10.28 0.72 1 204
Basic industry Siemens AA 0.2 0.2 -31.5 14.7 0.89 0 176
Akzo Nobel A 26.2 20.3 3.8 53.3 0.81 1 249
Bayer A 15.9 4.1 -5.8 119.1 0.97 1 194
Linde A 31.5 21.2 7.4 74.6 0.77 1 196
Saint Gobain A 12.2 2.9 -26.9 78.1 0.96 1 178
Investor BBB 28.2 7.2 -80.9 55.7 0.88 1 254
Lafarge BBB 15.8 7.4 -47.7 40.9 0.89 1 241
Thyssenkrupp BBB 22.3 3.6 -40.2 68.4 0.96 1 174
Rolls-Royce BBB 14.1 2.5 -43.7 45.8 0.96 0 201
HeidelbergCement BBB/BB 11.3 1.0 -58.0 66.2 0.99 0 277
Financial ABN AMRO AA 8.8 12.0 -18.4 22.1 0.51 1 224
ING AA 11.0 18.6 -5.4 23.1 0.71 1 230
BSCH A 19.8 10.2 -17.1 56.6 0.47 1 140
Dresdner A 5.2 3.8 -29.5 27.7 0.52 1 177
Banca Monte A 24.0 13.2 0.2 47.5 0.74 1 96
Food/Beverage Allied Domecq BBB 22.5 14.4 -1.7 34.8 0.87 1 140
BAT A/BBB 32.2 13.2 -13.9 55.1 0.95 1 210
Gallaher BBB 24.9 18.6 10.0 38.7 0.91 1 224
Retail Casino BBB 27.6 6.4 -8.6 61.5 0.97 1 221
LVMH BBB 6.0 2.2 -41.3 48.1 0.88 0 226
Ahold BBB/BB/B 6.8 0.4 -47.9 339.4 0.98 0 180
Telecoms/Media Olivetti BBB 3.2 0.6 -37.3 23.8 0.98 0 172
Portugal Telecom A 10.2 4.1 -24.1 32.5 0.94 1 317
Sonera BBB/A 20.6 18.5 7.7 32.6 0.86 1 139
Telefonica A -4.3 -1.1 -71.8 22.9 0.97 0 289
Wolters Kluwer A/BBB 51.5 14.8 -27.9 122.5 0.49 1 100
Deutsche Telek. A/BBB -48.1 -9.6 -169.4 18.0 0.86 1 217
France Telecom BBB -40.6 -5.6 -402.2 60.3 0.86 1 465
KPN BBB 10.1 0.8 -495.1 154.2 0.96 0 485
TDC A/BBB 44.5 40.5 20.0 83.2 0.53 1 181
Utilities/Energy Total AA 7.3 16.9 -1.1 16.2 0.53 1 215
Suez A 1.7 0.6 -21.1 20.7 0.92 0 157
Vattenfall A 15.5 12.8 -0.9 23.1 0.95 1 175
Endesa A/BBB 8.3 3.6 -67.0 36.3 0.94 1 269
Repsol BBB -7.6 -0.6 -148.5 56.2 0.98 0 254
Average 11.6 7.7 -51.5 55.4 0.81 214    28
Table 5 The Liquidity-Adjusted Difference between the Default Premium Implied and the CDS 
Premium 

















- - ￿ a
. The hypothesis 
tests for the difference in means of the two samples at the 0.01 significance level.  
 
Industry Company Rating Mean t-statistic Min. Max. Corr. Rj/Ac N
Autos BMW A 0.9 1.5 -24.1 24.7 0.25 0 238
Volkswagen A -1.4 -1.4 -17.3 11.6 0.54 0 111
Volvo A 12.1 8.3 -4.0 25.3 0.90 1 167
DaimlerChrysler A/BBB -19.82 -12.0 -55.19 7.965 0.67 1 204
Basic industry Siemens AA -2.4 -1.9 -34.6 11.8 0.89 0 176
Akzo Nobel A -1.2 -0.8 -33.5 28.1 0.70 0 249
Bayer A 11.1 2.8 -9.9 114.7 0.96 1 194
Linde A 22.6 13.6 -10.7 65.1 0.70 1 196
Saint Gobain A 5.4 1.3 -32.4 70.5 0.96 0 178
Investor BBB 20.7 5.4 -87.0 50.1 0.87 1 254
Lafarge BBB 11.6 5.4 -54.7 37.8 0.88 1 241
Thyssenkrupp BBB 14.1 2.3 -51.1 55.5 0.96 0 174
Rolls-Royce BBB 5.4 1.0 -56.5 34.3 0.96 0 201
HeidelbergCement BBB/BB 2.4 0.2 -66.9 56.6 0.99 0 277
Financial ABN AMRO AA 5.7 7.7 -19.5 19.0 0.57 1 224
ING AA 7.3 11.6 -8.5 20.4 0.72 1 230
BSCH A 11.1 5.7 -28.4 46.9 0.12 1 140
Dresdner A 1.3 0.9 -33.7 25.4 0.46 0 177
Banca Monte A -4.3 -2.5 -26.6 19.8 0.71 0 96
Food/Beverage Allied Domecq BBB 19.9 12.1 -5.1 33.2 0.85 1 140
BAT A/BBB 25.4 10.2 -16.9 50.4 0.92 1 210
Gallaher BBB 20.9 15.0 5.1 38.2 0.88 1 224
Retail Casino BBB 17.8 4.3 -18.2 44.4 0.97 1 221
LVMH BBB 0.8 0.3 -43.8 45.8 0.86 0 226
Ahold BBB/BB/B -38.6 -2.7 -186.7 255.3 0.94 1 180
Telecoms/Media Olivetti BBB -3.1 -0.5 -41.2 20.7 0.99 0 172
Portugal Telecom A 5.0 1.9 -27.2 30.7 0.94 0 317
Sonera BBB/A 18.3 16.0 5.6 30.9 0.86 1 139
Telefonica A -10.4 -2.5 -75.2 16.3 0.97 0 289
Wolters Kluwer A/BBB -7.3 -2.1 -85.1 64.5 0.47 0 100
Deutsche Telek. A/BBB -56.0 -11.2 -180.9 8.7 0.84 1 217
France Telecom BBB -59.4 -8.4 -429.3 55.1 0.84 1 465
KPN BBB -35.3 -2.9 -534.7 82.5 0.94 1 485
TDC A/BBB 39.7 35.6 16.2 78.5 0.50 1 181
Utilities/Energy Total AA 3.1 6.0 -3.8 12.1 0.82 1 215
Suez A -5.3 -1.9 -40.7 18.9 0.86 0 157
Vattenfall A 12.1 9.8 -3.7 20.6 0.95 1 175
Endesa A/BBB 2.0 0.9 -81.0 34.3 0.87 0 269
Repsol BBB -23.3 -1.9 -159.3 40.8 0.98 0 254
Average 0.7 3.3 -65.6 43.8 0.80 214    29
Table 6 Summary of Differences between the Default Premium and the Market CDS Premium  
In general, average differences become smaller after stripping out liquidity. After peeling off the 
liquidity premium from the bond yield spread, the average difference becomes negative for B-
rated firm.  
 
Rating Mean t-statistic Min. Max. Corr. Accep. Firms N
Panel A: Average differences: Naive Model 
AA 6.8 11.9 -14.1 19.0 0.66 1 4 845
A 13.7 9.2 -13.6 44.3 0.77 3 15 2823
BBB 11.2 6.2 -91.1 56.3 0.87 5 18 4238
BB 11.3 1.0 -58.0 66.2 0.99 1 1 277
B 6.8 0.4 -47.9 339.4 0.98 1 1 180
Panel B: Average differences: Liquidity adjusted
AA 3.4 5.8 -16.6 15.8 0.75 1 4 845
A 5.1 3.5 -24.1 36.6 0.73 9 15 2823
BBB -1.4 3.0 -104.4 43.5 0.85 7 18 4238
BB 2.4 0.2 -66.9 56.6 0.99 1 1 277
B -38.6 -2.7 -186.7 255.3 0.94 0 1 180  
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Table 7 Bond Yield Spread Explained by the Market CDS Premium  
We estimate the following regression:  1
*
1 1
* * e + ￿ + = - t t t s b a r y . Coefficient t-statistics are 
shown below each estimate. R^2 is adjusted R² in the table.  
 
Industry Company Rating a1 b1 RMSE R^2 Bonds
Autos BMW A 32.14 0.26 5.3 0.0874 4
(16.9) (4.8)
Volkswagen A 20.88 0.73 7.0 0.3082 4
(3.0) (7.0)
Volvo A 26.63 0.88 6.2 0.7521 5
(10.3) (22.4)
DaimlerChrysler A/BBB 32.53 0.67 11.6 0.5218 5
(5.5) (14.8)
Basic industry Siemens AA 21.34 0.54 4.0 0.8008 3
(19.7) (26.5)
Akzo Nobel A 18.89 1.07 12.2 0.6418 2
(8.2) (23.1)
Bayer A 14.69 1.02 10.5 0.9316 2
(7.5) (51.2)
Linde A 28.17 1.07 9.9 0.6357 2
(8.8) (18.4)
Saint Gobain A 26.16 0.90 11.2 0.9209 3
(11.2) (45.3)
Investor BBB 51.80 0.79 19.2 0.7941 2
(16.9) (31.2)
Lafarge BBB 31.48 0.82 10.2 0.7937 4
(11.7) (30.3)
Thyssenkrupp BBB 64.35 0.77 14.6 0.9198 2
(19.3) (44.4)
Rolls-Royce BBB 27.30 0.90 16.2 0.9166 2
(10.6) (46.8)
HeidelbergCement BBB/BB 38.84 0.94 19.8 0.9760 2
(13.6) (105.8)
Financial ABN AMRO AA 25.40 0.24 3.3 0.3535 3
(43.4) (11.1)
ING AA 16.22 0.66 4.1 0.5143 6
(15.3) (15.5)
BSCH A 77.05 0.11 4.2 0.2390 4
(67.0) (6.6)
Dresdner A 39.30 0.20 5.8 0.2964 7
(35.0) (10.0)
Banca Monte A 17.54 1.23 10.2 0.5776 3
(5.0) (11.3)    31
Table 7 Continued 
 
Industry Company Rating a1 b1 RMSE R^2 Bonds
Food/Beverage Allied Domecq BBB 42.58 0.67 5.8 0.7395 3
(18.7) (19.8)
BAT A/BBB 33.63 0.95 7.9 0.9009 3
(17.1) (43.5)
Gallaher BBB 30.62 0.94 5.9 0.8428 2
(12.3) (34.5)
Retail Casino BBB 28.14 0.99 10.6 0.9470 4
(12.0) (62.6)
LVMH BBB 41.99 0.68 11.8 0.7869 4
(14.6) (28.8)
Ahold BBB/BB/B -34.42 1.21 31.1 0.9759 5
(-9.0) (92.0)
Telecoms Olivetti BBB 36.24 0.80 17.1 0.8866 2
(9.0) (39.5)
Portugal Telecom A 18.11 0.91 9.9 0.9064 2
(13.4) (57.7)
Sonera BBB/A 11.76 1.11 5.6 0.7208 2
(3.7) (18.8)
Telefonica A 34.47 0.60 10.4 0.9318 3
(29.2) (64.5)
Wolters Kluwer A/BBB 34.86 1.11 25.5 0.2862 3
(2.6) (6.6)
Deutsche Telek. A/BBB 98.67 0.37 14.9 0.7439 3
(26.8) (25.0)
France Telecom BBB 79.12 0.54 40.2 0.7575 3
(19.2) (38.0)
KPN BBB 32.79 0.91 50.4 0.9337 4
(9.1) (82.5)
TDC A/BBB 90.69 0.44 7.1 0.3490 3
(22.8) (9.8)
Utilities/Energy Total AA 12.97 0.67 3.7 0.3838 3
(9.3) (11.6)
Suez A 12.74 0.90 8.7 0.8601 2
(4.5) (30.9)
Vattenfall A 26.83 0.81 3.3 0.8995 3
(24.5) (39.4)
Endesa A/BBB 30.63 0.66 8.5 0.9110 2
(30.9) (57.9)
Repsol BBB 48.36 0.78 26.9 0.9550 3
(15.8) (73.1)    32
Table 8 Yield Spread Explained by the Market CDS Premium and the Liquidity Premium 
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n
t j t t t n
c s b a r y . Coefficient t-
statistics are shown below each estimate. R^2 is adjusted R² in the table. 
 
Industry Company Rating a2 b2 c2 RMSE R^2 Bonds
Autos BMW A 38.48 0.22 -0.99 4.5 0.3441 4
(22.1) (4.7) (-9.6)
Volkswagen A 44.72 0.81 -9.93 6.1 0.4757 4
(6.1) (8.8) (-5.9)
Volvo A 17.91 0.95 0.46 5.2 0.8273 5
(7.4) (28.0) (8.4)
DaimlerChrysler A/BBB 35.69 0.62 0.59 11.4 0.5375 5
(6.0) (12.7) (2.6)
Basic industry Siemens AA 15.03 0.47 3.68 3.5 0.8450 3
(11.4) (23.1) (7.0)
Akzo Nobel A 57.95 0.81 -0.87 10.1 0.7577 2
(15.3) (18.4) (-11.9)
Bayer A 17.08 1.02 -0.61 10.5 0.9326 2
(7.0) (50.5) (-1.7)
Linde A 45.06 0.98 -1.31 7.8 0.7733 2
(15.2) (21.0) (-10.8)
Saint Gobain A 10.99 0.93 1.66 10.7 0.9274 3
(2.5) (44.8) (3.9)
Investor BBB 52.24 0.58 3.06 17.7 0.8259 2
(18.5) (14.5) (6.8)
Lafarge BBB 44.15 0.80 -2.63 9.3 0.8307 4
(14.7) (32.8) (-7.2)
Thyssenkrupp BBB 59.35 0.70 2.11 12.5 0.9411 2
(20.2) (40.2) (7.9)
Rolls-Royce BBB 25.46 0.89 0.33 16.2 0.9170 2
(8.0) (41.3) (1.0)
HeidelbergCement BBB/BB 31.62 0.90 2.16 18.9 0.9781 2
(10.3) (73.4) (5.1)
Financial ABN AMRO AA 23.72 0.25 0.42 3.1 0.4443 3
(38.8) (12.5) (6.0)
ING AA 20.01 0.60 -0.61 4.1 0.5337 6
(12.4) (12.9) (-3.1)
BSCH A 78.59 0.14 -0.41 4.1 0.2960 4
(65.3) (7.6) (-3.3)
Dresdner A 36.89 0.23 0.54 5.4 0.3935 7
(33.1) (11.9) (6.2)
Banca Monte A -6.23 1.04 1.03 9.5 0.6363 3
(-0.9) (9.2) (3.9)  33
Table 8 Continued 
 
Industry Company Rating a2 b2 c2 RMSE R^2 Bonds
Food/Beverage Allied Domecq BBB 62.29 0.51 -3.77 5.1 0.7995 3
(16.9) (13.3) (-6.4)
BAT A/BBB 38.08 0.94 -0.49 7.7 0.9084 3
(17.5) (44.1) (-4.1)
Gallaher BBB 31.00 0.93 0.15 5.9 0.8445 2
(12.5) (32.1) (1.6)
Retail Casino BBB 27.86 0.95 0.53 9.4 0.9585 4
(13.3) (64.4) (7.8)
LVMH BBB 53.27 0.64 -1.29 10.6 0.8296 4
(17.8) (29.5) (-7.5)
Ahold BBB/BB/B -40.89 1.34 -0.35 29.8 0.9780 5
(-10.3) (43.8) (-4.5)
Telecoms Olivetti BBB 71.06 0.68 -2.18 16.6 0.8941 2
(7.1) (19.0) (-3.8)
Portugal Telecom A 21.59 0.89 -0.45 9.8 0.9085 2
(11.8) (53.4) (-2.8)
Sonera BBB/A 56.53 0.71 -9.81 4.3 0.8369 2
(10.9) (11.8) (-9.8)
Telefonica A 29.15 0.61 0.67 10.3 0.9332 3
(12.3) (60.1) (2.6)
Wolters Kluwer A/BBB 47.51 1.12 -0.21 25.6 0.2880 3
(1.7) (6.6) (-0.5)
Deutsche Telek. A/BBB 134.22 0.43 -6.05 11.9 0.8391 3
(31.2) (33.3) (-11.2)
France Telecom BBB 70.98 0.44 1.74 38.6 0.7771 3
(17.0) (21.2) (6.4)
KPN BBB 29.72 0.84 0.41 46.3 0.9442 4
(8.9) (68.7) (9.5)
TDC A/BBB 98.45 0.46 -1.75 6.9 0.3948 3
(22.4) (10.4) (-3.7)
Utilities/Energy Total AA -1.95 1.14 0.80 3.5 0.4595 3
(-0.6) (11.2) (5.5)
Suez A 16.60 0.88 -0.29 8.4 0.8700 2
(5.6) (30.7) (-3.4)
Vattenfall A 34.71 0.74 -1.33 3.3 0.9046 3
(12.3) (25.8) (-3.0)
Endesa A/BBB 31.81 0.62 0.16 8.3 0.9147 2
(31.2) (38.7) (3.8)
Repsol BBB 36.06 0.78 0.86 26.6 0.9562 3
(6.5) (70.6) (2.6)  
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Table 9 Summary of Regression Coefficients by Ratings 
Both coefficients and associated t-statistics are the arithmetic means. We observe that adding 
liquidity improves R², though the degree of improvement varies. 
 
a1 b1 RMSE R^2
Panel A: Bond yield spread explained by CDS premium
AA 18.9838 0.5244 3.8 0.5131
(21.9) (16.2)
A 27.0246 0.7854 8.0 0.6473
(16.5) (27.4)
BBB 46.4326 0.7656 16.9 0.7770
(15.3) (38.3)
BB 38.8390 0.9425 19.8 0.9760
(13.6) (105.8)
B -34.4190 1.2139 31.1 0.9759
(-9.0) (92.0)
a2 b2 c2 RMSE R^2
Panel B: Bond yield spread explained by CDS premium and liquidity premium
AA 14.1998 0.6155 1.0729 3.5 0.5706
(15.5) (14.9) (3.9)
A 33.3342 0.7316 -1.4435 7.3 0.7211
(15.1) (25.8) (-2.5)
BBB 52.7318 0.7170 -0.4686 15.9 0.8000
(15.1) (33.0) (0.3)
BB 31.6210 0.8977 2.1579 18.9 0.9781
(10.3) (73.4) (5.1)
B -40.8850 1.3381 -0.3521 29.8 0.9780
(-10.3) (43.8) (-4.5)    35
Table 10 Pricing Differences Explained by Equity Volatility  


























statistics are shown below each estimate. R^2 is adjusted R² in the table.    
 
Industry Company Rating a3 b3 RMSE R^2 Correlation
Autos BMW A 19.73 -0.42 7.52 0.1553 -0.394
(6.68) (-6.55)
Volkswagen A 29.46 -0.70 4.46 0.6083 -0.780
(11.93) (-12.83)
Volvo A 11.28 -0.07 6.39 0.0031 -0.056
(3.17) (-0.71)
DaimlerChrysler A/BBB 13.26 -0.68 11.42 0.3029 -0.550
(3.60) (-9.3)
Basic industry Siemens AA 15.57 -0.46 6.69 0.3432 -0.586
(6.69) (-9.54)
Akzo Nobel A 28.13 -0.54 7.34 0.2361 -0.486
(8.91) (-7.5)
Bayer A 3.57 0.10 10.53 0.0122 0.110
(1.02) (1.54)
Linde A 7.17 0.38 12.99 0.0186 0.136
(0.98) (1.92)
Saint Gobain A
Investor BBB 28.13 -0.24 22.76 0.0123 -0.111
(4.75) (-1.77)
Lafarge BBB 9.84 -0.09 11.80 0.0052 -0.072
(3.29) (-1.114)
Thyssenkrupp BBB 73.60 -1.51 19.50 0.2556 -0.506
(8.57) (-7.69)
Rolls-Royce BBB 40.69 -0.92 16.84 0.1582 -0.398
(6.41) (-6.11)
HeidelbergCement BBB/BB
Financial ABN AMRO AA




Banca Monte A -1.96 -0.07 9.30 0.0013 -0.036
(-0.25) (-0.34)    36
Table 10 Continued  
 
Industry Company Rating a3 b3 RMSE R^2 Correlation
Food/Beverage Allied Domecq BBB 41.32 -0.75 6.46 0.2674 -0.517
(11.38) (-7.02)
BAT A/BBB 31.32 -0.39 9.81 0.0415 -0.204
(7.73) (-2.98)
Gallaher BBB 17.85 -0.04 7.17 0.0024 -0.049
(7.98) (-0.73)
Retail Casino BBB 25.61 -0.41 11.20 0.0205 -0.149
(3.84) (-2.12)
LVMH BBB 52.02 -1.24 15.08 0.2506 -0.522
(7.89) (-8.65)
Ahold BBB/BB/B -43.66 -0.18 50.54 0.0036 -0.060
(-3.22) (-0.86)




Telefonica A 86.93 -2.50 18.15 0.5745 -0.758
(16.39) (-20.26)
Wolters Kluwer A/BBB
Deutsche Telek. A/BBB 140.47 -3.34 29.55 0.6031 -0.777
(12.32) (-18.07)
France Telecom BBB 78.87 -1.97 58.18 0.3563 -0.597
(9.05) (-15.99)
KPN BBB 78.03 -1.84 64.73 0.3673 -0.606
(9.67) (-16.73)
TDC A/BBB 51.79 -0.39 9.92 0.0101 -0.101
(4.05) (-1.35)
Utilities/Energy Total AA
Suez A 25.50 -0.57 11.39 0.2468 -0.497
(5.67) (-7.13)
Vattenfall A
Endesa A/BBB 56.55 -2.12 17.15 0.6326 -0.795
(19.11) (-23.77)
Repsol BBB 78.69 -2.81 39.95 0.3301 -0.575
(8.01) (-11.14)    37
Figure 1 Akzo Nobel: Market CDS Premium, Default Premium after Adjusting Liquidity and 
Default Premium Implied from Bond Prices 
The market CDS premiums are lower than the default premiums implied from bond prices in 
the whole period. After deducting the time-varying liquidity premium from the bond yield 
spread, the liquidity-adjusted default premium is almost indistinguishable from the market CDS 





















































































































































































































Default premium after adjusting liquidity
Default premium implied from bond prices  38
Figure 2 France Telecom: Market CDS Premium and Default Premium Implied from Bond 
Prices 
Before December 12, 2001 and after November 12, 2002, the market CDS premium and the 
default premium implied from bond prices closely resemble each other. Only in the period of 
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Figure 3 France Telecom: Liquidity Adjusted Pricing Differences and Implied Put Volatility 




















- - ￿ a
is negatively 
correlated with market uncertainty. The higher the implied put volatility, the greater the CDS 
quote over the implied bond par yield. The result is in line with the CTD option argument 
embedded in the CDS prices. 
 
































































































































Liquidity adjusted Pricing Differences (Basis Points) Implied Put Vol. (Percentage)
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